Sorry for taking so long to post about Apple's fiscal 2Q 2011 results. By now everyone surely has all their answers, so I'll keep it short (and you can get the gritty details in the tables below). Compared to my estimates, a huge iPad miss ($1.6b) partly offset by iPhone upside ($1.1b), among lesser effects, resulted in almost $600m revenue miss. All of it was made up through lower costs hitting operating income within 0.2%, and nailing pre-tax income. Slightly lower tax rate and share dilution than expected resulted in EPS 8 cents (1.2%) higher than expected. All margin ratios were slightly better than expected. Revenue guidance roughly inline but EPS guidance significantly higher than expected, which suggests continued high margins. Here's all the details:
Showing posts with label actual. Show all posts
Showing posts with label actual. Show all posts
Friday, April 22, 2011
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Smooth Operator
No need to ask.
He's a smooth operator
"That's a part of the magic at Apple, and I don't want anybody copying it."
"Excellence has become a habit."
"If this is cannibalization it feels pretty good."
I'm happy and relieved to see Apple finally beating my estimates after I had been slightly overshooting for the last couple of quarters.
Thanks to Steve, Tim and the rest of the Team, all Apple employees, for kicking major ass. To paraphrase a commenter in another post: me and my family and our accounts thank you, Apple.
Anyway, on to the details. Solid quarter with upside across the board, except Macs and iTunes coming a bit below my estimates. The $670m revenue upside and 50 bps GM beat was tempered by slightly higher than expected operating expenses and tax rate, resulting in a 21 cent "surprise" (3.2%).
But the real shock of the report is not that much on the December quarter but in Q2 ending in March, which looks to be another record in the making (ironically Q2 is usually the weakest of the year). Not only did they guide higher than the admittedly lowball WS analysts expectations, PO also shattered my own "sandbagged" estimate, and almost guided up into my "real" estimate of $5.07. That would have been, and is unprecedented.
All the details:
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
Fiscal 4Q '10 actual results vs. estimates
I'll have to fine tune the iPhone and iPad projections. Everything else came in a bit soft, with iPod and iTunes the weakest. On the income statement, I started with a relatively small $219m (1.1%) revenue shortfall, but made it worse at every step (most impact was from guessing GM a bit high) and it widened to $403m (7.4%) shortfall in pretax income. Fortunately this was almost all offset by a much lower tax rate than estimated, resulting in actual EPS only 9 cents short of estimated, or within 2%. Guidance for the current quarter was impressive.
Here's all the details. I've included the combined iPad+iPhone figures to highlight how those two big errors balanced out.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Fiscal 1Q '10 actual results vs. estimates
Apple beat my revenue estimate by $666M (hmm), an understatement of 4.2% on my part. Source of this is relatively evenly shared between all three main product lines, with Apple's solid crush of Mac units estimate partly compensated by my overshooting the ASP a bit. On a relative basis, most significant is the -6.5% error (-$221M) in iPod revenue which came from compounding a -2.2% error in estimating units (-470K) with a -4.4% error in estimating ASP (-$7). Finally, a 13.9% underestimation of Peripherals revenue is not as critical in absolute $M, but is still quite a nice surprise as this is the second consecutive quarter Apple crushes my peripherals estimate, so I'm now giving a boost to my model's longer-term attach rates for peripherals. Surely some sort of magic going on there.
Over to the income statement, an overshoot in GM% practically erased all of those mistakes in the revenue breakdown. Apple came in 150bp below my admittedly optimistic 42.4% GM estimate (I was tired of hearing PO's excuses for lowballing on this, and decided to completely ignore his air freight and component warnings). Thankfully it saved me from another embarrassing miss, and allowed me to waltz through most of the rest of the income statement line items within a percentage point or so of the actual figures. The only small issues I have is with OpEx which came a little too high (even a tad higher than Apple's guidance which is unusual), and OI&E for which I had ignored Apple's $30M guidance as silly given its cash position. It's inconsequential for now, but I do want to be able to model this based on interest rate trends and Apple's cash and equivalents, for the time when interest rates get back to normal and OI&E becomes a significant contributor to EPS. No luck so far. Finally, the net margin, 130bp below my hugely optimistic 22.8%. I should learn not to get carried away like that, as Apple did awesomely at 21.5% net margin. This was the first thing I noticed since I got crushed on revenue but Apple missed my EPS (and it worried me a bit at the time). I'll have to tone down the scorching profitability level very slightly.
Congrats to those who correctly guessed that Apple would make the accounting change in Q1. Yes, I got it wrong (and no, my reasoning wasn't at all based on any presumption that Joan Hoover would just tell me, a nobody, about such an important news item). I truly believe this was not the best way to go about it. For one thing, this report's figures have no clear relationship with what Apple had guided for back in October. Thus, not only the official record of Apple beating their own guidance is broken (of course they beat, but it's not "officially" sanctioned as in verifiably coming from Apple's own language in its reports), there's also no clear way to go about any top-down guidance analysis for it. You know, the thing many of us do in which we take Apple's lowball guidance, add back an average historically-derived "PO's lowball factor" to it, and aim our sights so our revenue and EPS estimates fall close to that. Not this time, Apple simply trashed their previous guidance for last quarter.
A similar disconnect is happening with investors, analysts, and financial reporters' interpretation of the numbers, in particular when trying to compare them to analysts consensus estimates. Obviously analysts mostly gave the old GAAP figures, some of them gave non-GAAP or new-GAAP, but the most quoted figure by the media was the old GAAP consensus. Turns out Apple by doing it like this has also trashed that gauge, it's no longer a comparable way to measure Apple's supposedly huge beat. So how do we know they really beat? and by how much? Well of course we know Apple, if it had reported based on old GAAP, would've easily beat even that "whisper" thing at $2.30, but people in general don't know and don't care to figure this out themselves (even I had a little conundrum in figuring that out). Apple clearly simply doesn't care for those old metrics anymore. That may be understandable given how those understated the company's performance, but why not provide a mechanism for a smooth transition? I say, respect the previous guidance that Apple itself gave to us, and also respect the analysts' consensus, even if it's way off, because no matter how wrong them analysts are, the consensus is the most quoted figure investors hear and read about, and investors rely on that mechanism for gauging any report against market expectations.
So people are naturally skeptical about all this, and some are assuming there are accounting tricks in play. Surely Apple's performance is quite jaw-dropping, looks highly suspicious to most in the face of the economic crisis, and to top it all most of the public know about the accounting scandals and simply distrust anything remotely reminiscing of an accounting sleigh-of-hand. To those that don't know about Apple's financial reporting preferences and style, I suppose this report can only make sense to them as a trick, after Enron, Worldcom, and all the recent banks shenanigans. Let's not forget Apple itself had it's own accounting scandal. No it wasn't overstating financial metrics to meet or beat expectations, but options. Still, that reinforces doubt. Well, the thing with this one is that it's just the opposite of that stereotype. Apple management tends to act, with regard to the stock, as understated as possible. The CFO and other executives tend to paint things in the least favorable way from a shareholder point of view. Who knows why, maybe they figure it's better to lay low and downplay your stock, perhaps to avoid attracting all sorts of curious eyes (competitors, the SEC, tax audits, envious freaks, and whatnot). Put it all together and you can see how the stock may have reacted as oddly as it did AH and the day after, wavering around $200 when this stock should be worth at least $288 today. It's clear to me the stock is reflecting this self-inflicted fear, uncertainty and doubt (self-FUD, although this time I think unintended).
Anyway, a smooth transition would have been achieved by only issuing new guidance based on the new accounting scheme. Obviously the same question would have come up regarding how to gauge the strength of such guidance against consensus expectations for Q2, and that's why my assumption or recommendation was to report and issue guidance this time as old GAAP, then sometime in the middle of the quarter announce the accounting change, making clear they would restate the last 3 years and forget all about that GAAP/non-GAAP stuff, and leave plenty of time for most analysts to realize they can throw away their old GAAP models and start talking their new GAAP models, and for the media to pick up on this and update the consensus data for the quarter, the fiscal year, and beyond. A bonus of doing it for Q2 is that the GAAP vs. non-GAAP discrepancy would be minimal for this quarter and for the next. So, even if some analysts don't bother or can't figure out how to make the switch, it still doesn't make the consensus worthless, because the effect is minimized. Thus, investors would have been much better able to appreciate Apple's beat. Only then, you would have a sensible way to measure whatever Apple reports against the market expectation. This, what they did, wasn't a trick of course, some of us know. But there's no clear and indisputable way (through official company filings) to tell exactly by how much it isn't one.
My performance details below. Apologies for the estimate fudging. It's all derived from what I published a few days ago, and a couple of things from my spreadsheet as it stood back then. Read the notes to see how.
Notes:
(*) Shows differences in these estimates compared to previously published estimates due to accounting change. See corresponding explanatory notes for special cases below (all other new figures marked with (*) are derived by applying already derived new estimates as inputs in its standard formula, e.g. newTax = newPretax * oldTaxRate).
(1) iPhone ASP - Looking forward, it makes sense to include "other" iPhone-related revenue (carrier payments and iPhone accessories) by rolling it into the ASP for simplicity of calculation and the subscription accounting requirement to separately calculate the handset hardware revenue recognition having been removed. Also, I've decided not to estimate the precise effect of deferring the $25 value of the rights to upgrade the iPhone software ($10 for Apple TV), and instead assume the recognized portion of this as attached to just the current period's units, also for simplicity and because the differences are relatively meaningless when compared to the aspired accuracy in estimates. This last simplification tends to penalize the ASP on those quarters with much stronger unit sales when compared to the trailing 2-year average, somewhat offsetting the first assumption which rolls in related revenue that isn't necessarily attached to each unit sold. For this F1Q2010, an originally estimated $247M worth of "other" iPhone related revenue (about $29 per estimated unit) that had been excluded from the original $590 ASP estimate has been added back, yielding $619 estimated ASP including all iPhone related revenue sources. Notice Apple stated an iPhone ASP of about $620, so backing that out of the $638 ASP as I'm modeling it, it reveals $18 per unit (about $160M) of this "other" stuff, which is well below the $29 per unit ($247M) I was estimating.
(2) Peripherals and Other Hardware revenue estimate now includes full recognition of ATV sales. This is derived by subtracting all other estimated revenue sources, including the new iPhone and Related Products and Services revenue estimate based on the new ASP estimate explained in (1) as an input, from the estimated non-GAAP total revenue published previously ($15,017M).
(3) New COGS estimate is derived by estimating a similar proportion as in previous company reports for the old non-GAAP adjustment to COGS over non-GAAP adjustment to revenue (close to 30%), as follows: take 30% of the difference between the original and the new estimates for iPhone and Related Products and Services revenue (.3*[5351-2815]=761), and 75% of the difference between the original and new estimate for peripherals revenue (.75*[404-392]=3) as representing the iPhone and ATV adjustments to COGS, respectively, and add these to the original COGS estimate of $7,893M, resulting in 7893 + 761 + 3 = $8,657M. There are many other ways to derive a non-subscription accounting estimate for COGS based on iPhone revenue and estimated gross margins, so feel free to try them out and let me know what you come up with. It shouldn't be too far off if you stick to sensible estimates for iPhone GM%.
Over to the income statement, an overshoot in GM% practically erased all of those mistakes in the revenue breakdown. Apple came in 150bp below my admittedly optimistic 42.4% GM estimate (I was tired of hearing PO's excuses for lowballing on this, and decided to completely ignore his air freight and component warnings). Thankfully it saved me from another embarrassing miss, and allowed me to waltz through most of the rest of the income statement line items within a percentage point or so of the actual figures. The only small issues I have is with OpEx which came a little too high (even a tad higher than Apple's guidance which is unusual), and OI&E for which I had ignored Apple's $30M guidance as silly given its cash position. It's inconsequential for now, but I do want to be able to model this based on interest rate trends and Apple's cash and equivalents, for the time when interest rates get back to normal and OI&E becomes a significant contributor to EPS. No luck so far. Finally, the net margin, 130bp below my hugely optimistic 22.8%. I should learn not to get carried away like that, as Apple did awesomely at 21.5% net margin. This was the first thing I noticed since I got crushed on revenue but Apple missed my EPS (and it worried me a bit at the time). I'll have to tone down the scorching profitability level very slightly.
Congrats to those who correctly guessed that Apple would make the accounting change in Q1. Yes, I got it wrong (and no, my reasoning wasn't at all based on any presumption that Joan Hoover would just tell me, a nobody, about such an important news item). I truly believe this was not the best way to go about it. For one thing, this report's figures have no clear relationship with what Apple had guided for back in October. Thus, not only the official record of Apple beating their own guidance is broken (of course they beat, but it's not "officially" sanctioned as in verifiably coming from Apple's own language in its reports), there's also no clear way to go about any top-down guidance analysis for it. You know, the thing many of us do in which we take Apple's lowball guidance, add back an average historically-derived "PO's lowball factor" to it, and aim our sights so our revenue and EPS estimates fall close to that. Not this time, Apple simply trashed their previous guidance for last quarter.
A similar disconnect is happening with investors, analysts, and financial reporters' interpretation of the numbers, in particular when trying to compare them to analysts consensus estimates. Obviously analysts mostly gave the old GAAP figures, some of them gave non-GAAP or new-GAAP, but the most quoted figure by the media was the old GAAP consensus. Turns out Apple by doing it like this has also trashed that gauge, it's no longer a comparable way to measure Apple's supposedly huge beat. So how do we know they really beat? and by how much? Well of course we know Apple, if it had reported based on old GAAP, would've easily beat even that "whisper" thing at $2.30, but people in general don't know and don't care to figure this out themselves (even I had a little conundrum in figuring that out). Apple clearly simply doesn't care for those old metrics anymore. That may be understandable given how those understated the company's performance, but why not provide a mechanism for a smooth transition? I say, respect the previous guidance that Apple itself gave to us, and also respect the analysts' consensus, even if it's way off, because no matter how wrong them analysts are, the consensus is the most quoted figure investors hear and read about, and investors rely on that mechanism for gauging any report against market expectations.
So people are naturally skeptical about all this, and some are assuming there are accounting tricks in play. Surely Apple's performance is quite jaw-dropping, looks highly suspicious to most in the face of the economic crisis, and to top it all most of the public know about the accounting scandals and simply distrust anything remotely reminiscing of an accounting sleigh-of-hand. To those that don't know about Apple's financial reporting preferences and style, I suppose this report can only make sense to them as a trick, after Enron, Worldcom, and all the recent banks shenanigans. Let's not forget Apple itself had it's own accounting scandal. No it wasn't overstating financial metrics to meet or beat expectations, but options. Still, that reinforces doubt. Well, the thing with this one is that it's just the opposite of that stereotype. Apple management tends to act, with regard to the stock, as understated as possible. The CFO and other executives tend to paint things in the least favorable way from a shareholder point of view. Who knows why, maybe they figure it's better to lay low and downplay your stock, perhaps to avoid attracting all sorts of curious eyes (competitors, the SEC, tax audits, envious freaks, and whatnot). Put it all together and you can see how the stock may have reacted as oddly as it did AH and the day after, wavering around $200 when this stock should be worth at least $288 today. It's clear to me the stock is reflecting this self-inflicted fear, uncertainty and doubt (self-FUD, although this time I think unintended).
Anyway, a smooth transition would have been achieved by only issuing new guidance based on the new accounting scheme. Obviously the same question would have come up regarding how to gauge the strength of such guidance against consensus expectations for Q2, and that's why my assumption or recommendation was to report and issue guidance this time as old GAAP, then sometime in the middle of the quarter announce the accounting change, making clear they would restate the last 3 years and forget all about that GAAP/non-GAAP stuff, and leave plenty of time for most analysts to realize they can throw away their old GAAP models and start talking their new GAAP models, and for the media to pick up on this and update the consensus data for the quarter, the fiscal year, and beyond. A bonus of doing it for Q2 is that the GAAP vs. non-GAAP discrepancy would be minimal for this quarter and for the next. So, even if some analysts don't bother or can't figure out how to make the switch, it still doesn't make the consensus worthless, because the effect is minimized. Thus, investors would have been much better able to appreciate Apple's beat. Only then, you would have a sensible way to measure whatever Apple reports against the market expectation. This, what they did, wasn't a trick of course, some of us know. But there's no clear and indisputable way (through official company filings) to tell exactly by how much it isn't one.
My performance details below. Apologies for the estimate fudging. It's all derived from what I published a few days ago, and a couple of things from my spreadsheet as it stood back then. Read the notes to see how.
Cheers!
-d
. Est(*) Act Err Err%
. -------- ----- ---- ------
Units (K):
Mac 3184 3362 -178 - 5.3%
iPhone 8650 8737 - 87 - 1.0%
iPod 20500 20970 -470 - 2.2%
ASP ($):
Mac 1354 1324 + 31 + 2.3%
iPhone 619(1) 638 - 20 - 3.1%
iPod 155 162 - 7 - 4.4%
Revenue breakdown ($M):
Mac 4312 4450 -138 - 3.1%
iPhone 5351(*) 5578 -227 - 4.1%
iPod 3170 3391 -221 - 6.5%
Music 1177 1164 + 13 + 1.1%
Perph 404(2) 469 - 65 -13.9%
SW 604 631 - 27 - 4.3%
Income statement ($M):
Revenue 15017(*) 15683 -666 - 4.2%
COGS 8657(3) 9272 -615 - 6.6%
GM 6360(*) 6411 - 51 - 0.8%
OpEx 1625 1686 - 61 - 3.6%
OpInc 4734(*) 4725 + 9 + 0.2%
OI&E 55 33 + 22 +67.8%
Pre-tax 4790(*) 4758 + 32 + 0.7%
Tax 1365(*) 1380 - 15 - 1.1%
NetInc 3425(*) 3378 + 47 + 1.4%
Shrs. 915 920 - 5 - 0.5%
EPS 3.74(*) 3.67 +.07 + 1.9%
Ratios:
GM% 42.4% 40.9% +1.5% + 3.6%
OpInc% 31.5% 30.1% +1.4% + 4.6%
Tax% 28.5% 29.0% -0.5% - 1.7%
NetInc% 22.8% 21.5% +1.3% + 5.9%
Notes:
(*) Shows differences in these estimates compared to previously published estimates due to accounting change. See corresponding explanatory notes for special cases below (all other new figures marked with (*) are derived by applying already derived new estimates as inputs in its standard formula, e.g. newTax = newPretax * oldTaxRate).
(1) iPhone ASP - Looking forward, it makes sense to include "other" iPhone-related revenue (carrier payments and iPhone accessories) by rolling it into the ASP for simplicity of calculation and the subscription accounting requirement to separately calculate the handset hardware revenue recognition having been removed. Also, I've decided not to estimate the precise effect of deferring the $25 value of the rights to upgrade the iPhone software ($10 for Apple TV), and instead assume the recognized portion of this as attached to just the current period's units, also for simplicity and because the differences are relatively meaningless when compared to the aspired accuracy in estimates. This last simplification tends to penalize the ASP on those quarters with much stronger unit sales when compared to the trailing 2-year average, somewhat offsetting the first assumption which rolls in related revenue that isn't necessarily attached to each unit sold. For this F1Q2010, an originally estimated $247M worth of "other" iPhone related revenue (about $29 per estimated unit) that had been excluded from the original $590 ASP estimate has been added back, yielding $619 estimated ASP including all iPhone related revenue sources. Notice Apple stated an iPhone ASP of about $620, so backing that out of the $638 ASP as I'm modeling it, it reveals $18 per unit (about $160M) of this "other" stuff, which is well below the $29 per unit ($247M) I was estimating.
(2) Peripherals and Other Hardware revenue estimate now includes full recognition of ATV sales. This is derived by subtracting all other estimated revenue sources, including the new iPhone and Related Products and Services revenue estimate based on the new ASP estimate explained in (1) as an input, from the estimated non-GAAP total revenue published previously ($15,017M).
(3) New COGS estimate is derived by estimating a similar proportion as in previous company reports for the old non-GAAP adjustment to COGS over non-GAAP adjustment to revenue (close to 30%), as follows: take 30% of the difference between the original and the new estimates for iPhone and Related Products and Services revenue (.3*[5351-2815]=761), and 75% of the difference between the original and new estimate for peripherals revenue (.75*[404-392]=3) as representing the iPhone and ATV adjustments to COGS, respectively, and add these to the original COGS estimate of $7,893M, resulting in 7893 + 761 + 3 = $8,657M. There are many other ways to derive a non-subscription accounting estimate for COGS based on iPhone revenue and estimated gross margins, so feel free to try them out and let me know what you come up with. It shouldn't be too far off if you stick to sensible estimates for iPhone GM%.
Monday, October 19, 2009
Fiscal 4Q '09 actual results vs. estimates
Two bottles of a Cabernet-Sauvignon from Mendoza, Argentina may not be enough celebration for this new all time high, not just because it's a new ATH, but rather for what we've been through over the last couple of years, and survived... and most impressively, for the short time it took to get us back on track. But I think I have some soul-searching pending, and so, that third bottle can wait for tomorrow's confirmation of an official close above $199.83. I just need to get this out of me now, and more wine might not help with that.
I feel somewhat responsible if anyone decided to make serious bets or hedges out of my misguided conservatism. If you did, I owe you one, and I hope to make it good next time. I normally try to focus on the long term (and that's what my targets up in the high 200's are for), but I know this time I've expressed more concern about a short-term correction than at other times, due to the modest numbers I was seeing for last quarter.
In my defense, the second most significant reason for my huge EPS miss was such a forgiving effective tax rate reported. Apple guided for 30% and I estimated 29.1% tax, based on historical trends. The report showed an effective tax rate of 25.6%, which would explain away about 30% (or about 8.5¢) of the 29¢ miss.
The rest, the most significant reason for the miss, of course comes from underestimating revenue by more than half a billion, and then gross margins came 40 bps higher than I expected (Apple guided for 34%, I was at 36.2%, and the report came at 36.6%). Only a couple of cents were due to the slightly lower OpEx and slightly higher interest income than I was modeling for. So the real organic upside (for me and most everyone else) mostly came from the revenue side of the equation.
Of the roughly 20¢ remaining due to the revenue miss, more than 2/3 (or half of the whole 29¢ miss) are due to the Mac's incredible performance. The rest is about 3 cents due to a surprisingly rising iPod ASP's, a couple of cents from iTunes upside, and another 2¢ from peripherals (most likely stemming from high attachment rates to Mac sales). Usually, I get all these revenue sources to fall on both sides of the fence so that they cancel each other out and thus allows me to get pretty close to the overall numbers, but this time I only had SW on the plus side, which barely took care of my relatively accurate but slightly lower iPhone revenue.
So, let me focus on the Mac. First, more than 3 million Macs, baby! 17% unit growth with the industry flat, and portables growing a scorching 35%. That's 300k more units than already lofty expectations (considering the economy) of 2.75M. But that's not what impressed me the most. What I couldn't believe and I'm still not sure how to explain is the sequential increase in Mac ASP's.
Didn't we just see Apple lowering prices, most steeply for laptops (the star of the quarter in terms of units) by hundreds of dollars? Isn't this the back-to-school quarter when many college students are getting their first self-purchased computer, and are extremely price conscious and tech savvy on all the cheap alternatives, netbooks, or aware of the "benefits" of a true gaming rig, a perennial "weakness" for the Mac? Wasn't this the quarter in which Microsoft supposedly got serious about conveying, through supposedly quite strong advert messages, the value advantage of going with a PC? Wasn't this supposed to be a quarter where the consumer would be spend-thrifty, and only buy absolutely necessary products?
So, how on earth did ASP's go up sequentially (although minimally)? I guess it's gotta be those $1700-$2500 15" and 17" MBP's that must be getting crazy popular among college students, perhaps precisely thanks to their reduced prices, but also obviously due to the unmatched features, quality, and experience. Could the secret to this success be as simple as just providing a satisfying, fun, high-quality, highly-valued experience for customers? Wait, that actually sounds like an obvious tautology. Well, not that obvious to some, perhaps.
Let this be my mea-culpa. I was wrong about the Mac! Not the iPhone, not the iPod, but the Mac, the segment that I'm always willing and eager to get bullish about. And I was afraid my 2.85M current and future unit estimates were at risk. Silly me.
Here's the detailed comparison:
. Est Act Err%
. ---- ---- -----
Income statement ($M):
Revenue 9322 9870 - 5.5%
COGS 5948 6256 - 4.9%
GM 3375 3614 - 6.6%
OpEx 1440 1421 + 1.3%
OpInc 1935 2193 -11.8%
OI&E 33 45 -26.0%
Pre-tax 1968 2238 -12.1%
Tax 573 573 - 0.1%
NetInc 1395 1665 -16.2%
Shrs. 913 914 - 0.2%
EPS ($) 1.53 1.82 -16.0%
Ratios:
GM% 36.2% 36.6% - 1.1%
OpInc% 20.8% 22.2% - 6.6%
Tax% 29.1% 25.6% +13.7%
NetInc% 15.0% 16.9% -11.3%
Revenue breakdown ($M):
Mac 3581 3952 - 9.4%
iPod 1502 1563 - 3.9%
iPhone 2265 2297 - 1.4%
iTunes 961 1018 - 5.6%
Periph 338 393 -13.9%
Software 676 647 + 4.5%
Units (M):
Mac 2854 3053 - 6.5%
iPod 10300 10177 + 1.2%
iPhone 7300 7367 - 0.9%
ASP ($):
Mac 1255 1294 - 3.1%
iPod 146 154 - 5.1%
iPhone 545 612 -10.9%
What did I get relatively close? A few inconsequential things: the OpEx number, the absolute tax provision (whatever), the shares outstanding (easy), the GM% (thankfully I read Turley's articles and dismissed PO's lame guidance), the iPhone revenue (not the ASP's, again those are out-of-this-world high, but it only gets reflected on the non-GAAP numbers), the iPod units, and the Mac ASP's (again, those are incredibly holding up but thankfully I didn't expect them to fall too much and thus avoided an even worse miss).
Oh, and I definitely got the subscription accounting change non-event right, first from my intuition of a bait-and-switch setup and later exclusively confirmed two weeks ago here through Joan Hoover's email.
Well, I should've known this big surprise was a sure thing when I heard Cramer do his 180° just as a huge amount of October options had expired worthless (both 190 calls and 185 puts):
"Investors who have waited and waited for a great time to buy Apple (AAPL Quote) will get their chance next week,"
Yea right, at a $10-$15 higher price! He was already working up the option volatility play for the benefit of his option-writing, market-maker puppet masters, IMO. Oh well, I guess that's what makes him a professional, and makes me an amateur.
One last thing, I seriously, truly nailed that guidance estimate, didn't I.
3mo ending Dec-2009 Revenue($B) EPS($)
. ------------- ------------
F1Q10 GAAP n-GAAP GAAP n-GAAP
------------------ ----- ------ ---- ------
Analysts consensus 11.44 ? 1.91 ?
Deagol's estimates 12.07 13.71 2.20 3.02
Apple guidance (e) 11.45 13.00 1.75 2.60
Apple guided for GAAP in a range of $11.3b to $11.6b revs (midpoint is $11.45b!) and $1.70 to $1.78 EPS (midpoint is $1.74!). That's the one thing I'm really proud of this time.
Congrats to all longs, and see ya soon at $300!
:d
Tuesday, July 21, 2009
Fiscal Q3 '09 actual results vs. estimates
100 bp GM surprise is nice. Happy to be a few cents below. Now guidance... really really happy about it.
Oh and I hit one number right on the nose! hehe that was cool.
Oh and I hit one number right on the nose! hehe that was cool.
. Est Act Err%
. ---- ---- -----
Income statement:
Revenue 8350 8337 + 0.2%
COGS 5403 5314 + 1.7%
GM 2948 3023 - 2.5%
OpEx 1349 1351 - 0.2%
OpInc 1599 1672 - 4.4%
OI&E 57 60 - 5.8%
Pre-tax 1655 1732 - 4.4%
Tax 508 503 + 1.0%
NetInc 1147 1229 - 6.7%
Shrs. 905 909 - 0.4%
EPS 1.27 1.35 - 6.3%
Ratios:
GM% 35.3% 36.3% - 2.6%
OpInc% 19.1% 20.1% - 4.5%
Tax% 30.7% 29.0% + 5.7%
NetInc% 13.7% 14.7% - 6.8%
Revenue breakdown:
Mac 3104 3329 - 6.8%
iPod 1587 1492 + 6.4%
Music 987 958 + 3.1%
iPhone 1689 1689 0.0%
Periph 413 341 +21.0%
Software 571 528 + 8.1%
Units:
Mac 2444 2603 - 6.1%
iPod 10800 10215 + 5.7%
iPhone 5000 5208 - 4.0%
ASP:
Mac 1270 1279 - 0.7%
iPod 147 146 + 0.6%
iPhone 550 557 - 1.2%
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